June 13, 2006
The political explanation is supported by two facts. The first is that within minutes of al-Zarqawi's death being publicly verified, the final positions in the Iraqi Cabinet were filled. The second is that almost immediately after al-Zarqawi went down, some 17 other sites were raided, and even more were raided after that. We doubt that the intelligence gathered at the scene of the first strike could be interpreted that quickly and an operation mounted that fast. That means that whoever passed intelligence to the United States had a lot of intelligence to pass. Al-Zarqawi kept things compartmentalized; he was a professional. So either the head of his operations turned, on his own, or someone above him who had a lot of information did. We think it is the latter.Now, I'm not sure I'd agree that these facts necessarily lead to the conclusion that Zarqawi was sold out. The raids could have been planned based on intel from a number of corners and timed to coincide with the bombing for any number of tactical reasons, not the least of which might be an interest in preventing the flight of high-value targets. Similarly, I'd want to know more about those appointments to cabinet posts before I could be persuaded. If all (or at least most) the new cabinet appointments were Sunnis, that would certainly lend credence to Stratfor's conclusions.
Assuming that there is at least some truth to Stratfor's conjecture as to how the facts actually played out behind closed doors, why would the Sunni establishment eliminate one of its most useful tools? According to Stratfor:
The Sunnis realized that their political position meant they no longer required the "services" of the jihadists -- who were not under Sunni control, though the Sunnis allowed them to operate on Iraqi soil and were able to exploit their actions. The situation regarding negotiations had also reached a point at which the Sunnis had to demonstrate their worth and good faith -- hence the delivery of al-Zarqawi.QandO Blog expands on the Stratfor position:Giving up the jihadists not only advanced the Sunnis' position, it also allowed them to avoid having to scale back the insurgency as a whole. The Sunni political leaders do not want to be targeted by both Shiite militiamen and jihadists angry over their betrayal, and thus do not want to give up the insurgency until the Sunnis have security guarantees from the Shia.
The circumstances surrounding the death of Zarqawi may support the notion of a political detente between previously unreconciled Shiite and Sunni factions. Though some suggest Zarqawi was sold out by an erstwhile compatriot and that his death may lead to political progress, there's some reason to believe his death may have been the result of a political accomodation rather than the cause of it. That, as Stratfor argues, "his betrayal was the result of a political decision by senior Sunni politicians who had used al-Zarqawi in their insurrection, knew where he was and gave him away."The difference in these two theories is, as noted, far from trivial as concerns the future of Iraq:
If Zarqawi's death was merely the death of one terrorist, albeit a prolific one, then it's of relatively little strategic value. If Zarqawi's death was the result of a Sunni buy-in to the political process, then it is monumentally important.It's pretty clear that somebody ratted out Zarqawi. We're just not sure who, or why. Whatever the facts, I'm not convinced that Zarqawi's death can be so easily dismissed as being of "little strategic value." Zarqawi's elimination may turn out to be a significant setback for al-Qaeda, considering the fact that he was both a strong and rspected leader among the al-Qaeda ranks and a huge pain in the arse to the coalition forces. Then again, it may have been a blessing, considering the fact that Zarqawi's propaganda campaign in Iraq was an unmitigated public relations disaster for al-Qaeda. Only time will tell whether Zarqawi's death will help or hinder the promotion of al-Qaeda's ultimate goals, and to what extent.
However the game may ultimately play out, nothing can diminish the excellent work of the personnel who took Zarqawi out. A sociopathic monster is dead, and the rest of the world owes a big, collective "thank you" to the folks who did us all the favor.
Posted by: Ragnar at
02:53 PM
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"he's just one terrorist."
Posted by: Jesusland Carlos at June 13, 2006 03:12 PM (8e/V4)
Posted by: john ryan at June 13, 2006 04:33 PM (TcoRJ)
Posted by: greyrooster at June 13, 2006 08:19 PM (ZVFO9)
Posted by: Jester at June 13, 2006 09:04 PM (TuAMG)
In the last week we've heard a lot of different explanations for where this intelligence came for. We've heard that a lot of it came from tapping into al Qaeda's use of cell phones and their use of the internet. We've heard that locals gave it away. We've heard that Sunnis did it because they were tired of the slaughter. We've heard that al Qaeda brass finally decided that Zarqawi was no longer an asset alive. We've been hearing stories about "smart dust". We've now heard that it was part of a quid pro quo in setting up the Iraqi government.
What I think we're seeing is a disinformation campaign, which is intended in part to disguise and distract people from figuring out how they really found him, and in part to seriously affect al Qaeda's morale and operations.
After all, any of those things could be correct, and from now on al Qaeda operatives are going to be nervous about damned near everything. Are the neighbors snitches? Can I trust my fellows in the organization? How do I communicate with others when my communications could be getting intercepted? ...and so on.
From my study of history and the way that these kinds of intelligence breakthroughs are generally exploited, this kind of disinformation campaign is quite common, and pretty much the one thing you can be sure of is that the real story is one you haven't heard.
Posted by: Steven Den Beste at June 13, 2006 11:06 PM (+rSRq)
There are so many ways to slip up. At some point he'd have the Bonnie & Clyde finish.
From here on in it would seem that we've got an 'in'.
I can't see AQ in Iraq sealing off the intelligence breaches.
I'd expect that many players are bugging out right now. Perceived risk has exploded.
The Iraqi Army is about to 'flood the zone' in Baghdad.
The end of the Sunni phase may be at hand.
Posted by: blert at June 14, 2006 12:59 AM (a1gzd)
Posted by: Howie at June 14, 2006 07:32 AM (/Xibe)
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